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an inside sales person in an insurance company who became
an outside agent with the same company and argued,
successfully, that independent contractor classification was
appropriate.18 Accordingly, the taxpayer was allowed to
deduct unreimbursed business expenses on Schedule C.19
The taxpayer "received extensive benefits, including paid
vacation and sick days, was covered by a company-
sponsored health and dental plan, and was eligible for a
401(k) and pension plan" in which the employer matched
the taxpayer's contributions.20
Despite the individual's participation in employee
benefits, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
taxpayer was an independent contractor. In a footnote to the
decision, the court noted, "in theory, a person could be an
independent contractor for [some] purposes yet remain an
employee for ERISA qualification, but such instances
should be rare."21 The court explained that how an
employer chooses to compensate a worker is irrelevant to
the common law tests of employee status.
Current uncertainty
At present, the question of independent contractor
versus employee status and the consequences of the
determination, are in a state of substantial uncertainty. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue has been quoted as
saying that, "it does not matter to the IRS whether a worker
is classified as an employee or as an independent contractor
so long as the worker...is paying his or her proper amount of
taxes.22
Several bills have been introduced in Congress to
streamline the definition of who may be properly classified
as an independent contractor.23 Unfortunately, none of the
bills introduced to date takes an appropriately broad view of
the problem.  All focus on the payroll tax issue only .
That's important, but it's not the whole story.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 36.03 (1996);
Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.06[2] (1996).
2 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-600, Sec. 530, 92 Stat.
2885 (1978).
3 Id., Sec. 530(b), 92 Stat. 2885 (1978).
4 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub.
L. 97-248, Sec. 269(c), 96 Stat. 552 (1982).
5 I.R.C.  §§ 3508(b)(1), 3508(b)(2).
6 Ltr. Rul. 8040011, June 24, 1980.
7 See 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 36.03[1], n. 18 (1996).
8 1987-1 C.B. 296.
9 Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 297.
10 E.g., Eastern Investment Corp. v. United States, 49 F.3d
651 (10th Cir. 1995) (20-factor test applied to find sales
representatives were employees, not independent
contractors).
11 E.g., Weber v. Comm'r, 60 F.3d 1104 (4th Cir. 1995)
(United Methodist minister deemed to be employee);
Butts v. Comm'r, 49 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 1995)
(insurance agent was independent contractor permitted
to report business expenses on Schedule C; taxpayer
received paid vacation, pension and 401(k) plan, 75
percent of health insurance costs, coverage under
employer's malpractice policy and payment of licensing
and professional fees).
12 See I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(1), 162.
13 I.R.C. § 67(a).
14 E.g., Butts v. Comm'r, 49 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 1995)
(fringe benefits provided by employer of insurance
agent).
15 Ltr. Rul. 9546018, Aug. 18, 1995.
16 Id.
17 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,553 (6th Cir. 1995).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id., n. 5.
22 See Stratton, "Worker Classification Issues Hound
Employers, IRS, and the Courts," 68 Tax Notes 673
(Nov. 6, 1995).
23 E.g., H.R. 1972, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.
582, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor's mother died four
days before the debtor filed for Chapter 11. The mother's
will was not admitted to probate until more than 180 days
after the petition. During the interim, the debtor participated
in settlement negotiations with the other heir. The court held
that because, under state law, a beneficiary of a decedent's
estate acquires an interest in the estate upon the decedent's
death, the debtor acquired the interest in the mother's estate
pre-petition and the interest was included in the debtor's
bankruptcy estate. In re Chappel, 189 B.R. 489 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1995).
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtor had used 165 acres of rural
property in Texas as the home of his family, consisting of
several children and a spouse. In 1987, four days after the
death of the spouse, the debtor signed a homestead
disclaimer as to the property in order to obtain financing
secured by the property. At the time of the petition, the
children had moved away and the debtor lived alone on the
property. Under Texas law, a disclaimer of a homestead was
not effective if the debtor used the property as a homestead
and owned no other property usable as a homestead. The
court held that the disclaimer was not effective because the
debtor did not own any other property at the time of the
disclaimer and used the property as a homestead. The debtor
claimed the entire 165 acres as exempt family rural
homestead property. A creditor objected, arguing that the
debtor was single and lived alone; therefore, the debtor was
entitled only to the 100 acre rural homestead exemption.
The court held that, under Texas law, the property became a
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family homestead when the debtor lived there with the
children and spouse and that the debtor was entitled to treat
the property as a family homestead so long as the debtor
continued to live there. Matter of McDaniel, 70 F.3d 841
(5th Cir. 1995).
PRE-PETITION CONVERSIONS. Within two weeks
before filing for Chapter 7, the debtors purchased life
insurance policies with all of their cash. The life insurance
policies were claimed as exempt property. A creditor sought
denial of discharge of the debtors, arguing that the pre-
petition conversion was made with intent to defraud
creditors. The debtors admitted that the purchase of the
insurance policies was made in order to decrease the amount
of nonexempt assets available for the bankruptcy estate. The
court held that the mere conversion of nonexempt assets to
exempt assets just prior to filing for bankruptcy was
insufficient to deny a discharge without additional evidence
that the debtors engaged in sharp dealings, concealment of
assets, or misrepresentations. In re Carletta, 189 B.R. 258
(Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1995).
REVOCATION OF DISCHARGE. The Chapter 7
debtors had failed to include in their list of assets an interest
in a land sales contract to purchase land. The trustee failed
to discover the fraud and bring an action for revocation of
discharge until more than one year after the granting of a
discharge in the case. The debtors argued that the action was
barred by the one year limit of Section 727(d)(1). The
trustee sought to extend the limitation period by "equitable
tolling" under which the limitation period did not run until
the fraud was discovered. The court held that the statute did
not allow for any equitable tolling of the limitation period.
In re Reynolds, 189 B.R. 199 (Bankr. D. Or. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. Prior to the debtor's filing of a
Chapter 13 petition, the IRS had filed a levy against the
debtor's bank account to cover partially a tax deficiency.
The debtor sought a ruling that collection of the funds post-
petition would violate the automatic stay because the funds
were bankruptcy estate property. The court distinguished
this case from a levy against salable property, where the
debtor retained a right of redemption and the cost of the
redemption was less than the value of the property. The
court held that, because the debtor retained no rights to the
money and would not attempt to redeem the funds by
paying the higher tax debt, the debtor retained no rights
which passed to the bankruptcy estate; therefore, collection
of the levy would not violate the automatic stay. In re
Smiley, 189 B.R. 338 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
CLAIMS. The debtor filed under Chapter 13 and the
IRS filed a secured claim for taxes, indicating that post-
petition interest could be payable on the claim. However,
the debtor's plan provided for full payment of the tax claim
without any interest, since the plan characterized the tax
claim as an unsecured priority claim. The IRS did not object
to the plan. Two years after the plan confirmation, the IRS
filed an amended claim which differed from the claim
included in the plan on two points: the claim was
characterized as secured and included 10 percent post-
petition interest. The debtor objected to the amended claim,
arguing that the confirmation of the plan made all of its
provisions binding on the IRS. The court held that the IRS
could seek amendment of the plan two years after
confirmation. The court noted that the debtor's
mischaracterization of the IRS claim in the plan was a good
faith error and that, if the bad faith was found on the
debtor's part, the amendment would have been allowed. In
re Brenner, 189 B.R. 121 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995).
DISCHARGE. The IRS sought to have the debtor’s pre-
petition taxes declared nondischargeable under Section
523(a)(1)(C) because the debtor filed fraudulent returns for
the taxes or wilfully attempted to evade taxes by hiding
assets. The debtor’s nondebtor spouse had made two loans
to the debtor and had received loans from a corporation
which was owned by the debtor’s sons and which employed
the debtor. The debtor and nondebtor spouse kept their
assets separate and filed separate tax returns. The debtor did
not own any interest in the sons’ corporation. The loan
proceeds received by the nondebtor spouse were invested in
the nondebtor spouse’s separate property. The court held
that the debtor did not receive any income from the
nondebtor spouse’s loans to the debtor or from the
corporation; therefore, the debtor did not hide any assets or
income from these transactions and the pre-petition taxes
were dischargeable. In re Cox, 156 B.R. 323 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1993), aff'd on point, 189 B.R. 214 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
The debtor had failed to file income tax returns for 1984-
1988, although the debtor had provided for withholding of
taxes equal to an amount which the debtor believed was
sufficient to cover any tax liability. The debtor did file the
missing returns after being contacted by the IRS and only
then discovered a substantial tax liability. The IRS sought
denial of the debtor's discharge under Section 523(a)(1)(C)
for willful attempt to evade taxes. The court noted that the
debtor had not mistated any returns or concealed any assets
or income. The debtor's "tax protestor" activities were
limited to sending letters to the IRS complaining about the
collection procedures. The court held that the debtor's
conduct did not amount to a willful attempt to evade taxes.
In re Fuller, 189 B.R. 352 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995).
DISMISSAL.The debtors had filed for Chapter 11 and
their plan was confirmed. During the plan, the debtors failed
to pay post-petition income taxes incurred in their dairy
farm operation. The IRS moved for dismissal of the case
because the failure to pay the post-petition taxes represented
a continuing loss of the estate and demonstrated that the
debtors did not have a reasonable likelihood of a successful
rehabilitation. The debtors responded that friends would
give enough money to pay the taxes and that they could use
carryforward losses to eliminate the tax liability. The court
held that the case was dismissed because the debtors did not
supply any evidence of the previous tax losses and the
failure to pay the taxes demonstrated that the debtors could
not successfully complete the plan. Matter of Berryhill,
189 B.R. 463 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
NOTICE TO IRS . The debtor filed for Chapter 7 and
the notice for the filing of claims was sent to the IRS service
center where the debtor sent tax returns. The IRS
acknowledged receipt of the notice but failed to file a claim
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until 11 months after the bar date for claims. The IRS did
not present any reason for the delay and did not request an
extension of time to file the claim. The IRS argued that the
notice was not adequate because the notice was not sent to
the special procedures section in Pittsburgh. The court found
that the local bankruptcy rules contained no provision for
notices to the IRS in Pittsburgh and held that the notice to
the service center was adequate. In re Benny's Leasing,
Inc., 189 B.R.350 (W.D. Pa. 1995), aff'g on
reconsideration, 187 B.R. 484 (W.D. Pa. 1995), aff'g, 166
B.R. 823 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations designating Georgia as a validated brucellosis-
free state. 60 Fed. Reg. (Dec. 29, 1995).
The plaintiffs purchased dairy cattle from an Indiana
dairy farmer. The Indiana State Board of Animal Health (the
Board) had tested the diary farm's herd and found three
cows with brucellosis. The Board instructed the federal
veterinarian to quarantine the cows which had contact with
the diseased cows, but much of the dairy farmer's herd was
not quarantined. The plaintiffs' dairy herd became
contaminated with brucellosis and had to be destroyed. The
plaintiffs sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
for damages caused by the negligence of the federal
veterinarian. The court held that the federal veterinarian did
not owe an special duty to the plaintiffs but was operating to
protect the public in general; therefore, no recovery could be
claimed from the federal veterinarian under the FTCA.
Stratmeyer v. U.S., 67 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1995).
MARKETING ORDERS-ALM § 10.05[1].* The
plaintiffs were almond handlers who challenged an almond
marketing order which required a handler to pay an
advertising assessment unless the handler individually paid
for “authorized” advertising. The plaintiffs challenged the
order as violating their First Amendment rights. The court
held that the advertising assessment violated the First
Amendment free speech rights of the handlers and that the
government failed to demonstrate that the assessment
accomplished its purpose of increasing the sales of almonds.
The case was remanded for imposition of a remedy. On
remand the District Court ordered the USDA to refund the
amounts the almond handlers had paid since 1980, to release
all assessments in escrow and to reimburse the handlers for
amounts spent on creditable advertising. The USDA argued
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the award of
the reimbursement for creditable advertising paid for by the
handlers, because the reimbursement would be an award of
monetary damages. The appellate court agreed and held
that, although the requirement that the handlers purchase
advertising violated the Constitution, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity barred reimbursement from the USDA
because the USDA did not receive the money for the
advertisements. The USDA also argued that the refund
amount should be decreased by the amount of benefit the
handlers received from the advertising, otherwise the
handlers would be unjustly enriched. The court held that the
doctrine of unjust enrichment did not apply to constitutional
violations. Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S.D.A., 67 F.3d 874 (9th
Cir. 1995), rev'g in part and aff'g in part unrep. D. Ct.
dec. on remand from, 14 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1993).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* Potato producers had filed claims
against a purchaser for the PACA trust funds. The purchaser
had granted a security interest in its accounts receivable to
secure a revolving line of credit. The secured creditor
argued that it was a bona fide purchaser of the accounts
receivable. the court found that, under the security
agreement, the creditor had no interest in the accounts
receivables unless the purchaser failed to repay the
borrowed funds and that the creditor could demand
repayment of the loan without first collecting from the
accounts receivable. The court held that this arrangement
was a security interest and was subordinate to the trust fund
claims of the producers. The creditor also argued that some
of the producers were not eligible for PACA trust funds
because the commodities sold to the purchaser were not
fresh vegetables. The court found that some of the potatoes
were peeled, cut, blanched, and seared in oil in preparation
for freezing and then sold frozen to the purchaser. The court
held that these potatoes were eligible fresh vegetables and
the producers could recover from the PACA trust. The court
found that other potatoes were processed similarly but with
the added processing of adding oil for home oven cooking
or breading. The court held that these potatoes did not
qualify as fresh vegetables and denied the producers' claim
for PACA trust funds. Endico Potatoes, Inc. v. CIT
Group/Factoring, Inc., 67 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* An irrevocable trust had been established in 1975
which was funded with corporate stock and which provided
for payment of four years of college tuition and other
expenses of the grantor's grandchildren. After the
corporation was dissolved, the trustee petitioned a state
court for interpretation of the trust. A college-aged
grandchild also petitioned the state court for allowing the
college tuition payments to apply to a five year college
program. The IRS ruled that both amendments of the trust
by the state court decisions did not subject the trust to
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9602016, Oct. 11, 1995.
The decedent's share of community property passed to a
trust for the surviving spouse. Under the trust provisions, if
the marital share exceeded the GSTT exemption, the trust
was to be split into an exempt GSTT marital share and a
nonexemption GSTT marital share. The estate tax return
Schedule R was filled out as if a reverse QTIP election was
being made for the exempt GSTT marital share but the
reverse QTIP election was not indicated. An attachment to
the return allocated all of the GSTT exemption to the
exempt GSTT marital share. The estate later filed an
amended return to make the reverse QTIP election. The IRS
ruled that an extension of time to make the election was
allowed but ruled that the allocation of the exemption was
irrevocable. Ltr. Rul. 9603021, Oct. 20, 1995.
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GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* The taxpayer issued two $100,000
checks, one to each of the taxpayer's  two children and the
children signed no interest demand notes for repayment of
the money. However, the taxpayer testified that the taxpayer
had no intention of seeking repayment but intended to
forgive the indebtedness over several years. In the
subsequent years, the taxpayer sent letters to the children
indicating how much of the loans was forgiven. The court
held that the initial checks were gifts and not loans, based
on several factors: (1) no interest was charged; (2) no
security was required; (3) although the notes had fixed
maturity dates, the taxpayer did not intend to enforce them;
(4) no demand was made for repayment; (5) no repayments
were made; (6) the taxpayer did not provide any evidence
that the children had sufficient income or assets to repay the
notes; (7) the "loans" were not consistently treated as such
in the taxpayer's records; and (8) the taxpayer did not file
gift tax returns for the loan forgiveness amounts in excess of
the annual exclusion amount. Miller v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-3.
LIFE INSURANCE. A parent created two identical
irrevocable trusts, one for each child. The trusts provided
that the grantor and beneficiary could not be a trustee. The
trust also provided that the trustee could purchase life
insurance on the life of the beneficiary and pay the
premiums from trust principal. If the trust purchased life
insurance on the life of the beneficiary, (1) the beneficiary
could not transfer another life insurance policy to the trust if
the beneficiary paid for the premiums on that policy and (2)
the beneficiary could not exercise any power of appointment
over trust principal. Annual net trust income was to be
distributed to the beneficiary and the trustee had absolute
discretion to distribute trust principal. The IRS ruled that the
a beneficiary would not be considered as having any
incidents of ownership of the life insurance policies on the
life of the beneficiary. Ltr. Rul. 9602010, Sept. 29, 1995.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent's will left property in trust to the decedent's spouse
but the trust provided that the trustees, the decedent's sons,
had absolute discretion for distributions from the trust to the
surviving spouse. The executor of the decedent's estate
petitioned the state probate court for an amendment of the
trust to provide that all of the trust's net income be
distributed to the surviving spouse at least annually. The
probate court issued an order so amending the trust. The
executor then filed the estate tax return and claimed the trust
as QTIP. The court held that the state court order was not
binding for federal estate tax purposes and was contrary to
the clear language of the trust; therefore, the trust did not
qualify as QTIP because all of the net annual income was
not required to be distributed to the spouse. Estate of Rapp
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-10.
POWER OF ATTORNEY. Two months before death,
the decedent became seriously ill and executed a power of
attorney in favor of the decedent's two daughters. Within the
month before the decedent's death, one daughter wrote 16
$10,000 checks to various family members; however, the
checks were not cashed until two days after the decedent's
death. The court questioned the dates on the checks because
the check numbers were higher than checks written by the
decedent after the dates of the gift checks, indicating that the
gift checks were written after the decedent became
incapacitated and were written without the decedent's
knowledge. The court found that the gift checks were not
made with the decedent's intent to make the gifts. The court
also held that, because the power of attorney did not
expressly authorize gifts of the decedent's property, the gift
checks were revocable by the decedent when made and were
included in the decedent's gross estate. Estate of Goldman
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-29.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that existing Form
706 may be used for decedent's dying after December 31,
1965.  Anew form will be available after enactment of
amendments to the estate tax provisions. Ann. 96-1.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 15.02[3].* In 1951, the decedent and parent owned
most of the stock of a family corporation. In order to meet
the inheritance and control desires of the shareholders, the
decedent and parent entered into an agreement for the
transfer of the parent's stock at death to the decedent in trust
for life with remainders to the parent's grandchildren. The
decedent agreed to transfer the decedent's stock by will to
the same trusts. The IRS argued that, although the
agreement was reached in bona fide bargaining and the
decedent did provide some consideration for the agreement,
the consideration was not full and adequate; therefore, the
stock in the trusts was included in the decedent's gross
estate. The court held that the value of the decedent's future
contribution of stock was not sufficient consideration for the
parent's agreement to transfer stock to the trusts; therefore,
the decedent's interest in the trust was not received for
adequate consideration. The court included the value of the
stock in the trusts in the decedent's gross estate, decreased
by the value of the decedent's stock contributed to the trusts.
Estate of Magnin v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-25.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
CONSERVATION EASEMENT. The taxpayer owned
farm land and donated a conservation easement to the
county. Although some of the land was tillable, much of it
was wooded and hilly and had primarily scenic value. The
easement generally prohibited development of the land but
allowed some building of residences in areas not exposed to
views from the neighboring road.  The IRS ruled that the
transfer was a qualified conservation contribution eligible
for the charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9603018, Oct. 19,
1995.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayer had settled a personal injury suit
and the settlement included prejudgment interest. The state
law characterized prejudgment interest as part of the
compensation for lost time value of the injury award.
However, the court held that prejudgment interest was not
part of the personal injury award and was not excludible
from gross income. Brabson v. U.S., 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,038 (10th Cir. 1996), rev'g, 94-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,446 (D. Colo. 1994).
The taxpayer's employment was terminated and the
taxpayer sought restitution from the employer. After
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negotiations, the parties agreed to a lump sum payment in
settlement of the taxpayer's grievances. The taxpayer argued
that the payment was excludible from gross income because
the payment was made in settlement of several tort claims.
The court held that the payment was includible in gross
income because the only claims raised by the taxpayer in the
negotiations were contract related and the employer was not
aware of any tort claims. Foster v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1996-26.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS. The taxpayer was a
company which provided its employees, spouses and
dependants with a health care plan funded with after tax
employee contributions and company contributions. The
company planned to expand the definition of spouse to
include domestic partners. The IRS ruled that if a domestic
partner was considered a spouse under state law, the
inclusion of coverage for domestic partners would not affect
the qualification of the plan. Ltr. Rul. 9603011, Oct. 18,
1995.
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS. The
following letter ruling has been withdrawn for
reconsideration. The taxpayer owned farm land which
became contaminated with pesticides and chemicals when
the land was used as an industrial waste site. The taxpayer
donated the land to the county which attempted to convert
the land to recreational use until the contamination was
found and then the county resold the land back to the
taxpayer for nominal consideration. The taxpayer was
responsible for the cleanup of the land and sought to deduct
the costs as ordinary business expenses under Rev. Rul. 94-
38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. The IRS ruled that Rev. Rul. 94-38 did
not apply because the land was not clean when the taxpayer
reacquired the land. The IRS also ruled that the costs were
capital costs not eligible for current deductions because the
land was no longer used in a trade or business. Ltr. Rul.
9541005, Sept. 27, 1995.
GROSS INCOME. The taxpayer owned nonresidential
rental properties with the taxpayer's spouse as tenants by the
entireties. Under state law, each spouse was entitled to half
of the rental income from the properties. The taxpayer filed
income tax returns as "married filing separately." The court
held that the taxpayer was taxable for only one-half of the
rental income from the properties, even though the rent was
paid by checks made out to the taxpayer. Ritter v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1996-15.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer was
employed fulltime with the U.S. postal service. The
taxpayer had inherited a ranch and raised about 40 head of
cattle and grew hay on the property. The taxpayer had
grown up on the ranch and had some high school education
in agriculture. The taxpayer worked on the ranch several
times a week and often stayed on the ranch on weekends.
The ranch had never yeilded a profit or gross income and
the taxpayer produced no credible evidence that the ranch
would be profitable in the future. The taxpayer did not
consult with experts and had no plan for producing a profit
except for a vague plan to increase the herd size after some
equipment loans were paid. The court held that the taxpayer
could not claim any deductions in excess of ranch income
because the taxpayer did not operate the ranch with an intent
to make a profit. Scales v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-544.
HOME OFFICE-ALM § 4.03[13].*  The taxpayer
worked as a hydraulic engineer and taught college courses
in hydraulic engineering. The taxpayer claimed a deduction
for home office expenses related to the expenses of
maintaining the residence. The taxpayer also deducted the
legal fees incurred in a divorce suit and a criminal contempt
case. The taxpayer determined the home office expense by
an estimate of the rental cost of the space; however, the
taxpayer did not obtain any professional appraisal. The court
held that the allocation of house expenses by that method
was not valid and allocated the expenses based on the
number of rooms in the house. The court also held that the
legal fees were not deductible because the fees were not
incurred as part of a trade or business. Swain v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1996-22.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS. The taxpayer had
purchased property along a highway intersection and had
planned a development of the land which included several
commercial rental properties. The taxpayer was to provide
management services for the tenants and to provide
construction services for development of the site. The state
highway department notified the taxpayer that it was
expanding the highway intersection and would need to
acquire a portion of the taxpayer's land. The highway
department had condemnation powers but entered into
negotiations with the taxpayer for purchase of the land
needed for the intersection expansion. The taxpayer revised
the original development plan to accommodate the smaller
area involved. The plan provided for additional
expenditures. The IRS cited Rev. Rul.67-254, 1967-2 C.B.
269 for the rule that replacement property could include
additional expenditures on the remaining portion of partially
condemned land if the additional expenditures were
necessary to restore the property to the original usefulness.
The IRS ruled that the land to be conveyed to the highway
department was conveyed under threat of condemnation and
that the additional expenditures made on the remaining
property qualified as replacement property for purposes of
the gain deferment provisions of I.R.C. § 1033. The IRS
noted that the deferred gain was to be charged against the
basis of the remaining property and that gain would be
recognized to the extent the gain exceeded the basis of the
remaining property. Ltr. Rul. 9603012, Oct. 18, 1995.
MEAL EXPENSES. The taxpayer owned and operated
several manufacturing and office operations. The taxpayer
provided onsite food facilities for its employees who were
allowed 30 or 45 minute meal breaks. The employees were
charged for the meals but at a cost less than the cost to the
taxpayer. The major issue was whether the meals were
furnished for a substantial noncompensatory business reason
in order to qualify as provided for the convenience of the
employer under I.R.C. § 119. The IRS ruled that (1) the
shortened meal period was not required by any business
need of the taxpayer and was required only to shorten the
work day of employees; (2) the eating facilities were not
required, since several commercial eating facilities were
nearby; and (3) other taxpayer concerns, such as the
availability of alcohol products at local restaurants and
increased traffic in the area, were not sufficient business
reasons for the shortened meal periods; therefore, the meals
were not provided for a substantial noncompensatory
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business reason and the employees could not deduct the
costs of the meals obtained at the taxpayer's facilities.  Ltr.
Rul. 9602001, Sept. 15, 1995.
LIFE INSURANCE. The IRS has announced that it
will no longer issue letter rulings where life insurance is
transferred to an unincorporated entity as to whether the
entity is a partnership or whether the transfer is exempt from
the transfer for value rules of I.R.C. § 101. Rev. Proc. 96-
12, I.R.B. 1996-3.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The taxpayers
converted a general partnership into a limited liability
company (LLC). The IRS ruled that the LLC would be
taxed as a partnership because (1) the LLC lacked the
corporate characteristic of continuity of life since the state
LLC law and the LLC agreement required the consent of all
members to continue the partnership after a terminating
event, and (2) the LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of
transferability of interests because the Act and agreement
provided that if any other member objected to the sale or
assignment of a member’s interest in the LLC, the transferee
or assignee had no right to participate in the management of
the LLC. The IRS also ruled that no gain was recognized
from the conversion of the limited partnership to the LLC.
Ltr. Rul. 9602018, Oct. 12, 1995.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in December
1995, the weighted average is 7.09 percent with the
permissible range of 6.38 to 7.73 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.38 to 7.80 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 96-
2.
The House has passed a bill limiting the states' authority
to impose an income tax on any retirement income of an
individual who is not a resident of the state. The Senate has
passed similar bills. H.R. 394, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
1996).
REFUNDS. The taxpayers had income taxes withheld
from their wages in 1987 which exceeded their claimed tax
liability for that year, but the taxpayers did not file an
income tax return for 1987. On September 26, 1990, the IRS
sent the taxpayers a notice of deficiency. The taxpayers
responded by filing their 1987 tax return with a claim for a
refund and a suit in the Tax Court for the payment of that
refund. The court held that, because the taxpayers failed to
file their return before the IRS filed a notice of deficiency,
the Tax Court had no jurisdiction as to a refund claim for
taxes paid more than two years before the deficiency notice
was mailed. The court noted that the withheld taxes were
deemed paid on the date the return was due for that taxable
year, April 15, 1987. The court also noted that the three year
limitation would have applied if the refund claim was
brought in the District Court. Lundy v. Comm'r, 96-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,035 (S. Ct. 1996).
RENT. The taxpayer owned a trucking business and
entered into an agreement to lease a truck. The lease
provided that, upon payment of all monthly payments, the
taxpayer would be deemed to have exercised an option to
purchase the truck without additional payments. The lease
payments were equivalent to payments which would have
been required by a conventional motor vehicle loan. The
taxpayer received title to the truck and, as owner, registered
the truck. The court held that the taxpayer could not deduct
the rent payments because the transaction was actually a
sale. In addition, the taxpayer realized gain from the sale of
the truck when the taxpayer received insurance proceeds in
excess of the taxpayer's basis in the truck. Tillman v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-8.
The taxpayer used the owner's former residence as an
office and storage area for a plumbing business. The
taxpayer corporation claimed a deduction for the fair rental
value of the residence. The court found that the IRS's
appraisal expert was more believable than the taxpayer's and
reduced the claimed deduction by almost one-half.
Southern Boiler Sales & Service, Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-13.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
SHAREHOLDER'S BASIS. The taxpayer was the sole
shareholder of an S corporation formed to purchase real
estate. The taxpayer obtained an unsecured loan from a bank
which was guaranteed by an unrelated third party. The loan
proceeds were deposited into the corporation's bank account
and the taxpayer withdrew amounts for personal and
business expenses. The guaranty fee was paid by the
corporation and the corporation made some payments on the
loan. The taxpayer claimed that the loan was actually made
by the taxpayer personally and the proceeds further loaned
to the S corporation. The court held that the loan was made
by the corporation and did not increase the taxpayer's basis
in the corporation. Reser v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-
572.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
February 1996
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.32 5.25 5.22 5.19
110% AFR 5.86 5.78 5.74 5.71
120% AFR 6.40 6.30 6.25 6.22
Mid-term
AFR 5.61 5.53 5.49 5.47
110% AFR 6.17 6.08 6.03 6.00
120% AFR 6.75 6.64 6.59 6.55
Long-term
AFR 6.09 6.00 5.96 5.93
110% AFR 6.71 6.60 6.55 6.51
120% AFR 7.33 7.20 7.14 7.09
NEGLIGENCE
TRESPASSER. The plaintiff's decedent was injured
when the decedent was riding a dirt bike on the defendant's
farm land and struck a cable across an unpaved path. The
decedent did not have premission to ride on the defendant's
property. The defendant had posted the property with no
trespassing signs and the cable had reflectors hanging on it.
The path and cable were over 100 yards from the nearest
highway. The court held that the defendant did not breach
any duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly inflicting
injury on a trespasser and affirmed a summary judgment for
the defendant. Morrell v. Peed Bros., Inc., 462 S.E.2d 798
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS
P.O. BOX 50703
EUGENE, OR 97405
24
ZONING
HOG CONFINEMENT FACILITY. The defendants
owned and operated a grain and livestock farm and
constructed hog confinement buildings on the property in
an area not zoned for such buildings. The defendants
argued that Iowa Code § 335.2 exempted the facilities from
zoning laws. The court held that the hog confinement
operation was a part of the defendants' existing grain and
livestock operation and qualified as an agricultural use
exempt from zoning laws. The plaintiff county board of
supervisors argued that Iowa Code § 172D.4(1) required
that feedlots comply with zoning laws. The court held that a
hog confinement facility was not a feedlot for purposes of
Section 172D.4; therefore, the statute did not remove the
agricultural use exemption and the confinement buildings
were not subject to zoning requirements. Thompson v.
Hancock County, 539 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1995).
CITATION UPDATES
Streetman v. United States, 187 B.R. 287 (W.D. Ark.
1995), rev'g unrep. Bankr. Ct. dec. on rem. from 189 B.R.
190 (W.D. Ark. 1994), aff'g and rev'g, 154 B.R. 723
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992), on rem. from, In re Russell,
927 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1991) (net operating losses) see
Vol. 6, p. 187.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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